# Rawls' Theory of Justice **Jonathan Wolff. An Introduction to Political Philosophy, 3rd ed., pp. 153-178 from the chapter "The Distribution of Property" (not the whole chapter). Oxford: Oxford University Press 2016.** ## Abstract This chapter examines the concept of distributive justice, asking in particular whether citizens should have the liberty to acquire and dispose of property however they see fit, or whether there are justified restrictions on economic activity in the name of liberty or justice. It begins with a discussion of the problem of distributive justice, taking into account a variety of differing opinions on how a liberal society should distribute property, along with the so-called income parade. It then considers property and markets, focusing on John Locke's ideas, and the free market principle. It also explores John Rawls's theory of justice and some of the criticisms levelled against him, including those by Robert Nozick. ## Notas - A Theory of Justice is a 1971 work by the philosopher John Rawls. Quote: "Certain principles of justice are justified because they would be agreed to in an initial situation of equality." - If two people have a disagreement on the rules of a game that has already started, what should they do? How can they agree on a fair or just outcome? They could (i) solve it with a previously-made agreement, if it were applicable to the case; (ii) ask the advice of an "impartial spectator"; (iii) conjure a hypothetical spectator ("what would you mother say if he were here?"); or (iv) appeal to a **hypothetical agreement**, where players imagine what they would have agreed on before they knew what was going to be their position in the game. - Similarly, a hypothetical agreement can be made to solve problems of justice. Rawls supposes that people's views of justice are often biased by their own interests. Therefore, he suggests that impartiality can be achieved if people in this hypothetical agreement are placed behind a **"veil of ignorance"** that makes them unaware of their particular circumstances. This is the **original position** where the hypothetical contractors would have to be at. People would be unaware of: - Their place in society: social status, gender, race, abilities, strengths, etc. - Their own conception of the good or their "special psychological propensities" (because people have different aims, ambitions and moral/religious/philosophical views). - Their societies' economic and political situation, their level of civilisation or culture, the generation to which they belong. - According to Rawls, under these conditions, people would agree to the following **principles** (in preference to Utilitarianism): - "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar system of liberty for all" **(Liberty Principle)**. - Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: - "to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged..." **(Difference Principle)**. - "attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity" **(Fair Opportunity Principle)**. - "Lexical priority" of the principles: Liberty > Fair Opportunity > Difference - Under the **Difference principle**, the distribution of wealth and income should be equal, unless inequality will be to everyone's advantage and, in particular, to the advantage of the worst off. How can Rawls justify that people would choose this principle? Rawls suggest this in the only rational choice. Why? - There are three possible principles for a rational choice: |Principle|Definition|What this would mean| |--------|----------|----------------------| |Utility maximisation|Choose the option with the highest average of profit|These people would should some version of the average utilitarian theory of justice — make the average position in society as good as possible| |Maximax (maximise the maximum)|Choose the option which has the "best best" outcome (however unlikely — it's like making a bet)|These people would choose a highly unequal society with a privileged, wealthy, and powerful ruling class| |Maximin (maximise the minimum)|Make sure that the worst possible outcome is as good as possible|These people would choose the **Difference principle**| - Why is **maximin** the rational choice at the original position (veil of ignorance)? According to Rawls, four reasons lead to the choosing of maximin over utility maximisation. - Physical constraints: you must choose a principle that is suitable for all levels of productivity (you can't expect for everyone to live in a palace). - Logical constraints: it must be logically possible (you can't choose the principle "everyone should be richer than everyone else" or "everyone should have slaves"). - Formal constraints: linked to a contract model. These are: - Publicity: terms must be known/knowable to all parties. - Finality: if a contract is made in good faith, the parties will not seek to revoke it just because it turns out badly. Therefore, I should not make a choice that I would want to go back on if things turned out badly. - Once-only choice: you get one attempt to make a choice from the original position. The maximisation of expectations involves grave risks (poverty, unemployment, etc.). Why take the risk if something better can be guaranteed by use of the maximin? - However, a defeat of maximisation is not automatically a win for maximin. Are there other principles? The principle of **constrained maximisation** would allow to maximise expectations, excluding any option that contains a very bad possibility (so there would be a minimum income, housing, etc.). Contemporary societies largely fit this model (free market + welfare state). - Rawls thinks the argument for constrained maximisation fails: the election of a "minimum" is arbitrary and, also, it might turn out to be economically impossible. Rawls suggests that the contracting parties, in trying to set a social minimum, would actually settle for making the worst off as well off as possible (going back to the Difference Principle). ## Objections to Rawls - Objection: Individuals might choose lesser or unequal liberty if this would make everyone better off (Utilitarianism). - Response: they wouldn't; the rational choice is maximim. - Objection: without any conception of the good, people would be unable to make any choices or decisions. - Response: people would possess a "**thin theory of the good**". This means that they know that they want "primary goods" (liberties, opportunities, wealth, income, and "social bases of self-respect"). To Rawls these fictional people would prefer more of these primary goods to fewer and would be rational, not envious and mutually disinterested. - Objection: It is not possible to claim that the outcome of a hypothetical contract would be just. This hypothetical outcome would also conflict with the results of many other hypothetical contracts. - Response: this contract has a privileged status because every element of the original position can be shown to be fair. - Objection: the "primary goods" of the "thin theory of the good" are not uncontroversial moral beliefs shared by all. The original position is biased in favour of a commercial, individualist society, ignoring the importance that non-commercial, communal goods could have in people's lives. - Objection: by saying that no one deserves to benefit from their strength, intelligence, wealth, etc., Rawls wishes to make the contracting parties ignorant of their natural or social assets. Many people would resist the idea that we never deserve to benefit from using our talents. In particular, if someone has worked harder than others to develop a talent or skill that they use to good effect. - Response: the ability to make an effort is influenced by social and natural factors beyond one's control. - Objection: it is not possible to follow both the Liberty Principle and the Difference Principle. - Form A: if we are concerned with equalizing liberty then we must also equalize property, for it seems obvious that the rich can do more than the poor, and hence have more liberty. Therefore, the Difference Principle allows inequalities of liberty, in conflict with the Liberty Principle. - Form B: to give people liberty means that we cannot impose any restrictions on individual property holdings. Limiting how much property people can acquire, and what they can do with it, is a way of reducing individual liberty. A proper respect for liberty rules out the Difference Principle, or, in fact, any other distributional principle. Robert Nozick has produced the most important version of this argument: imagine a society regulated by the pattern "to each according to their need". Suppose, then, that property is distributed in society so that people are given money in proportion to their needs. However, any pattern can be disrupted by people’s free actions (voluntary trade, gifts, etc.). Therefore, there can be just distributions which do not obey the original pattern. According to Nozick, patterns can only be enforced at grave cost to the Liberty Principle which, in theory, takes priority over the Difference Principle. - Response: the Liberty Principle does not distribute liberty as such. Rather it is concerned with giving individuals an extensive scheme of what Rawls calls "basic liberties", such as freedom of speech, or the right to run for public office. It does not say that people should be absolutely free from interference. - Objection: should Rawls not be troubled by Nozick’s observation that the Difference Principle can only be maintained by constant interference in people’s lives? - Response: it is true that to regulate society by the Difference Principle it is necessary to ban some transactions, and enforce the redistribution of property. But this could be done in a perfectly civilised, non-invasive, way, by the sort of tax and welfare system we are so familiar with. - Objection: taxation, according to Nozick, is on a par with forced labour. How can anyone who values liberty accept such a situation? - Response: calling taxation forced labour hardly seems appropriate. Rawls’s defenders add that we must not overlook that taxation for redistribution also increases liberty, for by increasing the income of the poor.